|
Ronald Reagan on Homeland SecurityPresident of the U.S., 1981-1989; Republican Governor (CA) |
Ronald Reagan exemplified the best way to approach such situations. His refusal to award trust that hadn't been earned changed the nature of our country's relationship with the Soviet Union. Over arms control, he insisted on verification; he wouldn't take the Soviets at their word because it would have been reckless to have done so. The Soviet Union wasn't entitled to that civility. Reagan forced the Soviets to make concessions up front before the United States made any in return. We know we're going to live up to any treaty. We have laws and protocols that ensure it, and our culture demands it. That wasn't true of the Soviet Union. Reagan insisted on inspection mechanisms with teeth, of the kind that previous administrations might have refused to pursue to completion.
My dream became a world free of nuclear weapons. Some of my advisors did not share this dream. They said a nuclear-free world was unattainable. Since I knew it would be a long and difficult task to rid the world of nuclear weapons, I had this second dream: the creation of a defense against nuclear missiles, so we could change from a policy of assured destruction to one of assured survival.
December 9, Regan demands a date for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Reagan, "SDI is essential to our goal of total nuclear disarmament."
Its simplicity of intent was not the least of its charms for a man who felt uncomfortable with the complexities of weapons systems-he confessed that he never understood what “this throw-weight business is all about.” Such technical matters would never plague his rhapsodic discussion of SDI: No one understood all its multiple if sketchy projections. It was more a wish than a single project, and such wishes are the very stuff of Reagan’s leadership.
Reagan said, "I have an argument to share with you--our anti-missile shield. We don't know if it is possible, but we are optimistic. If we come up with a solution, let us share it, make it available to everyone. Remove all fear of a nuclear strike."
No idea could have seemed more addled to Soviet perceptions than a universal defense against the ultimate offense, unless the President's shield was the sort of defense that kills. Yet he was insisting, "It's not a weapon, it's a system, a worthy dream."
Gorbachev demanded something in return, "This all depends on you giving up SDI." Reagan had been bracing for this. "SDI isn't a bargaining chip. If you are willing to abolish nuclear weapons, why are you so anxious to get rid of a defense against nuclear weapons?"
Gorbachev kept smiling, while the president got angrier. Both realized that their rush toward a zero option in Europe had been cowardly, a feint to postpone the unresolved issue. "It's [that] or nothing," Gorbachev said.
"The meeting is over," Reagan said.
"Mr. President, you have missed the unique chance of going down in history as a great president who paved the way for nuclear disarmament."
Reagan said, "That applies to both of us."
Gorbachev said, "I don't know what else I could have done."
Reagan said, "You could have said yes."
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack--that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles?
Current technology has achieved a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history.
I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents no to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Just for a start, he announced that the US intended to rearm with 100 B-1 bombers, 100 MX multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, a second generation of Trident subs, and a new, radar-invisible, stealth warplane.